Intersubjectivity in Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
PEP ASKS
In the following text of Phenomenology of perception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: "Reflective analysis is unaware of the problem of others, just as it is unaware of the problem of the world, because from the first flicker of consciousness it grants me the power to go toward a truth that is universal by right, and since the other is himself without haecceity [thisness], without place, and without a body, the Alter and the Ego are one and the same in the true world, wich is the unifier of minds. There is no difficulty in understanding how "I" can think the Other, because the "I", and consequently the Other, are not trapped in the fabric of phenomena and have a value rather than an existentce. Nothing is hidden behind these faces or these gestures, and there are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me; there is but a touch of shadow that owes its existence to the light. For Husserl, however, we know that there is indeed a problem of others, and the alter ego [the other myself] is a paradox. If another person is truly for-himself, beyond his being for-me, and we are for-each-other and not separately for-God, then we must appear to each other, we both must have an exterior, and there must be, besides the perspective of the For-Oneself (my view upon myself and the other's view upon himself), also a perspective of the For-Others (my view upon others and the view of others upon me). Of course, these two perspectives cannot be in each of us merely juxtaposed, for then others would not see me and I would not see others." I do not understand the sentence that starts with "Nothing is hidden" and ends with "existence to the light" and also I do not understand why the last sentence is true "Of course, these two perspectives cannot be in each of us merely juxtaposed, for then others would not see me and I would not see others.". Can you explain me?
CHAT GPT ANSWERS
Certainly! The passage you're grappling with from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* is deeply philosophical, dealing with the nature of consciousness, perception, and intersubjectivity (our relationship to others).
### 1. "Nothing is hidden behind these faces or these gestures, and there are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me; there is but a touch of shadow that owes its existence to the light."
This sentence can be interpreted as a critique of a particular approach to consciousness—specifically, reflective analysis. Merleau-Ponty is contrasting reflective analysis (which is associated with a detached, abstract, intellectual view of consciousness) with a more embodied, lived experience.
- **"Nothing is hidden behind these faces or these gestures":** In the context of reflective analysis, faces and gestures are treated as transparent or fully knowable. Reflective analysis assumes that consciousness can fully access the meaning of others' expressions (their faces and gestures) without any remainder, mystery, or depth.
- **"There are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me":** This suggests that reflective analysis assumes an almost omnipotent or all-seeing perspective. In this view, there are no aspects of the world or the lives of others that are beyond one's understanding. Everything is supposedly open to consciousness.
- **"There is but a touch of shadow that owes its existence to the light":** Here, Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that in reflective analysis, any sense of mystery or unknowing (the "shadow") is not something intrinsic to the world or to others, but merely a byproduct of the mind's own illumination (the "light"). The "shadow" is not a fundamental feature of the world; rather, it is a trivial byproduct of the light of consciousness. Reflective analysis downplays or ignores the real depth and ambiguity that might exist in our encounters with others and the world.
### 2. "Of course, these two perspectives cannot be in each of us merely juxtaposed, for then others would not see me and I would not see others."
In this sentence, Merleau-Ponty is addressing the complexity of intersubjectivity—the way that we, as subjects, relate to and perceive others as subjects.
- **The Two Perspectives:** Merleau-Ponty refers to two perspectives:
- The **For-Oneself** perspective: How I see myself, how the other sees themselves.
- The **For-Others** perspective: How I see the other, how the other sees me.
- **"These two perspectives cannot be in each of us merely juxtaposed":** If these two perspectives were simply side-by-side within each individual (juxtaposed), without any deeper integration, then true intersubjectivity wouldn't occur. Each person would remain isolated in their own perspective, unable to truly perceive or be perceived by the other.
- **"For then others would not see me and I would not see others":** If the perspectives of For-Oneself and For-Others were merely placed next to each other without interaction, it would mean that others would not truly perceive me as a subject (and vice versa). There would be no genuine connection or recognition between subjects. In other words, to truly see and be seen by others, these perspectives must be intertwined and integrated, rather than just coexisting separately.
### **Conclusion:**
Merleau-Ponty is arguing against a view of consciousness that assumes it has full, transparent access to the world and others. He is emphasizing that consciousness is embodied and that our relations with others are complex and involve a mutual recognition that can't be reduced to simple juxtaposition of perspectives. For a genuine relationship with others to exist, there must be an interplay and integration of perspectives that goes beyond mere side-by-side existence.
In the following text of Phenomenology of perception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: "Reflective analysis is unaware of the problem of others, just as it is unaware of the problem of the world, because from the first flicker of consciousness it grants me the power to go toward a truth that is universal by right, and since the other is himself without haecceity [thisness], without place, and without a body, the Alter and the Ego are one and the same in the true world, wich is the unifier of minds. There is no difficulty in understanding how "I" can think the Other, because the "I", and consequently the Other, are not trapped in the fabric of phenomena and have a value rather than an existentce. Nothing is hidden behind these faces or these gestures, and there are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me; there is but a touch of shadow that owes its existence to the light. For Husserl, however, we know that there is indeed a problem of others, and the alter ego [the other myself] is a paradox. If another person is truly for-himself, beyond his being for-me, and we are for-each-other and not separately for-God, then we must appear to each other, we both must have an exterior, and there must be, besides the perspective of the For-Oneself (my view upon myself and the other's view upon himself), also a perspective of the For-Others (my view upon others and the view of others upon me). Of course, these two perspectives cannot be in each of us merely juxtaposed, for then others would not see me and I would not see others." I do not understand the sentence that starts with "Nothing is hidden" and ends with "existence to the light" and also I do not understand why the last sentence is true "Of course, these two perspectives cannot be in each of us merely juxtaposed, for then others would not see me and I would not see others.". Can you explain me?
CHAT GPT ANSWERS
Certainly! The passage you're grappling with from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* is deeply philosophical, dealing with the nature of consciousness, perception, and intersubjectivity (our relationship to others).
### 1. "Nothing is hidden behind these faces or these gestures, and there are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me; there is but a touch of shadow that owes its existence to the light."
This sentence can be interpreted as a critique of a particular approach to consciousness—specifically, reflective analysis. Merleau-Ponty is contrasting reflective analysis (which is associated with a detached, abstract, intellectual view of consciousness) with a more embodied, lived experience.
- **"Nothing is hidden behind these faces or these gestures":** In the context of reflective analysis, faces and gestures are treated as transparent or fully knowable. Reflective analysis assumes that consciousness can fully access the meaning of others' expressions (their faces and gestures) without any remainder, mystery, or depth.
- **"There are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me":** This suggests that reflective analysis assumes an almost omnipotent or all-seeing perspective. In this view, there are no aspects of the world or the lives of others that are beyond one's understanding. Everything is supposedly open to consciousness.
- **"There is but a touch of shadow that owes its existence to the light":** Here, Merleau-Ponty is suggesting that in reflective analysis, any sense of mystery or unknowing (the "shadow") is not something intrinsic to the world or to others, but merely a byproduct of the mind's own illumination (the "light"). The "shadow" is not a fundamental feature of the world; rather, it is a trivial byproduct of the light of consciousness. Reflective analysis downplays or ignores the real depth and ambiguity that might exist in our encounters with others and the world.
### 2. "Of course, these two perspectives cannot be in each of us merely juxtaposed, for then others would not see me and I would not see others."
In this sentence, Merleau-Ponty is addressing the complexity of intersubjectivity—the way that we, as subjects, relate to and perceive others as subjects.
- **The Two Perspectives:** Merleau-Ponty refers to two perspectives:
- The **For-Oneself** perspective: How I see myself, how the other sees themselves.
- The **For-Others** perspective: How I see the other, how the other sees me.
- **"These two perspectives cannot be in each of us merely juxtaposed":** If these two perspectives were simply side-by-side within each individual (juxtaposed), without any deeper integration, then true intersubjectivity wouldn't occur. Each person would remain isolated in their own perspective, unable to truly perceive or be perceived by the other.
- **"For then others would not see me and I would not see others":** If the perspectives of For-Oneself and For-Others were merely placed next to each other without interaction, it would mean that others would not truly perceive me as a subject (and vice versa). There would be no genuine connection or recognition between subjects. In other words, to truly see and be seen by others, these perspectives must be intertwined and integrated, rather than just coexisting separately.
### **Conclusion:**
Merleau-Ponty is arguing against a view of consciousness that assumes it has full, transparent access to the world and others. He is emphasizing that consciousness is embodied and that our relations with others are complex and involve a mutual recognition that can't be reduced to simple juxtaposition of perspectives. For a genuine relationship with others to exist, there must be an interplay and integration of perspectives that goes beyond mere side-by-side existence.
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