Entrades

Intersubjectivity in Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

PEP ASKS In the following text of Phenomenology of perception of Maurice Merleau-Ponty: "Reflective analysis is unaware of the problem of others, just as it is unaware of the problem of the world, because from the first flicker of consciousness it grants me the power to go toward a truth that is universal by right, and since the other is himself without haecceity [thisness], without place, and without a body, the Alter and the Ego are one and the same in the true world, wich is the unifier of minds. There is no difficulty in understanding how "I" can think the Other, because the "I", and consequently the Other, are not trapped in the fabric of phenomena and have a value rather than an existentce. Nothing is hidden behind these faces or these gestures, and there are no landscapes that remain inaccessible to me; there is but a touch of shadow that owes its existence to the light. For Husserl, however, we know that there is indeed a problem of others, and the al

Consciousness is part of the world and distinct from the world. Maurice Merleau-Ponty.

PEP ASKS Can you explain me the folliwing text of Merleau-Ponty: "The world is not an object whose law of constitution I have in my possession; it is the natural milieu and the field of all my thoughts and of all my explicit perceptions."? CHAT GPT ANSWERS Certainly! The quote by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, a French phenomenologist, reflects his philosophical views on perception and the nature of the world as experienced by humans. Let's break it down: 1. **"The world is not an object whose law of constitution I have in my possession"**: - Here, Merleau-Ponty challenges the idea that the world is a fixed, objective entity that can be fully understood or explained by humans. Unlike some philosophical or scientific perspectives that view the world as something we can entirely grasp, analyze, and reduce to laws or formulas, Merleau-Ponty argues that the world is not an object that we can fully control or possess through our knowledge. 2. **"It is the natur

Merleau-Ponty. The world that is given to the subject because the subject is given to himself.

PEP ASKS Can you explain me the following phrase of Merleau-Ponty: "I began to reflect, my reflection is a reflection upon an unreflected, it cannot be unaware of itself as an event, henceforth it appears as a genuine creation, as a change in the structure of consciousness, and yet this involves reconizing, prior to its own operations, the world that is given to the subject because the subject is given to himself."? Can you explain me in concrete why he says "the world that is given to the subject because the subject is given to himself"? CHAT GPT ANSWERS Merleau-Ponty's phrase is a complex expression of his phenomenological ideas, which revolve around the relationship between the subject (the self) and the world. Let’s break it down to understand the key concepts: 1. **Reflection on the Unreflected**: - When Merleau-Ponty talks about "reflection," he means the process by which we become aware of our own thoughts, perceptions, and experien

Las dos formas de desesperación de Sören Kierkegaard aclaradas.

PEP PREGUNTA Me puedes explicar el siguiente fragmento de Sören Kierkegaard: "Una relación semejante, así derivada o punteada, es el yo del hombre: es una relación que se refiere a sí misma, y haciéndolo, a otra. De aquí surge que haya dos formas de verdadera desesperación. Si nuestro yo se hubiese planteado el mismo, no existiría más que una: no querer ser uno mismo, querer desembarazarse de su yo, y no se trataría de esta otra: la voluntad desesperada de ser uno mismo. "? CHAT GPT RESPONDE El fragmento de Søren Kierkegaard que mencionas está tomado de su obra "La enfermedad mortal" (1849). En este texto, Kierkegaard explora la noción de la desesperación, a la cual él describe como una enfermedad del espíritu, un estado en el que el ser humano se encuentra en una relación conflictiva consigo mismo. Vamos a desglosar el fragmento paso a paso: ### 1. "Una relación semejante, así derivada o punteada, es el yo del hombre: es una relación que se refiere a sí

A world first begins to exist for me. Un mundo primero comienza a existir para mí.

For I am the one who brings into being for myself - and thus into being in the only sense that the word could have for me - this tradition that I choose to take up or this horizon whose distance from me would collapse were I not there to sustain it with my gaze (since this distance does not belong to the horizon as one of its properties). Scientific perspectives according to which I am a moment of the world are always naïve and hypocritical because they always imply, without mentioning it, that other perspective -the perspective of consciousness - by which a world first arranges itself around me and begins to exist for me. PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION. Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Pues soy yo quien hace existir para mí -y por tanto en el único sentido que la palabra podría tener para mí- esa tradición que elijo retomar o ese horizonte cuya distancia respecto de mí se derrumbaría si yo no estuviera allí para sostenerlo con mi mirada (ya que esa distancia no pertenece al horizonte como una

Existence sustains essence. Merleau-Ponty.

PEP ASKS I do not understand the following phrase of Merleau-Ponty in his book Phenomenology of perception: "My existence does not com from my antecedents, nor from my physical and social surroundings; it moves out toward them and sustains them." What means by antecedents? The parents? CHAT GPT ANSWERS In the context of Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, the term "antecedents" generally refers to all factors that might be considered as the prior causes or conditions that lead to one's existence. This can include not only biological factors, like your parents and genetic inheritance, but also historical, cultural, social, and environmental conditions that precede and surround an individual's existence. However, Merleau-Ponty is arguing that one's existence is not simply a result of these antecedents (like a chain of causes and effects). Instead, he emphasizes that existence is dynamic and intentional—it is an active engagement with

Historicidad propia es resolver la repetición e historicidad impropia es esperar el destino.

Cita. SER Y TIEMPO. Martin Heidegger. El Dasein cotidiano está disperso en la multiplicidad de lo que "pasa" diariamente. Las eventualidades y circunstancias frente a las cuales el ocuparse está de (390) antemano "tácticamente" a la espera, conforman el "destino". El Dasein impropiamente existente sólo contabiliza su historia a partir de lo que es objeto de ocupación. Y puesto que entonces, llevado de un lado a otro por sus "quehaceres", el Dasein necesita, si quiere llegar a sí mismo, recogerse primeramente desde la dispersión y la inconexión de lo eventualmente "ocurrido", surge, por vez primera, desde el horizonte de comprensibilidad de la historicidad impropia, el problema de crear una "conexión" de la existencia [Dasein], entendida como una conexión de las vivencias que "también" están-ahí en el sujeto. La posibilidad del predominio de este horizonte problemático se funda en la falta de resolución, que constit